Introduction
This paper takes for granted that there are fallacies2, that they occur not infre quently in argumentative discourse and that they have a legitimate place in the curriculum of courses in critical thinking or informal logic. It goes on to argue that it makes logical sense to identify, and pedagogical sense to make students acquainted with fallacy variations which can properly be called 'ideological' fal lacies.
The identification of 'ideological' fallacies implies that the critique which infor mal logic employs against fallacious reasoning is extended to a critique of ideolo gical argumentation. This procedure poses two problems which need to be ad dressed. The first problem concerns the criteria for the identification of 'ideo logical' fallacies and calls for a clarification of the concept of ideology. The second problem concerns the place which 'ideological' fallacies are to be accor ded in a 'taxonomy' of fallacies. In what follows I shall discuss and clarify the meaning of the concept of ideology for the concerns of this paper. Following this theoretical discussion I shall present instances o f 'ideological' fallacies and argue that the teaching of 'ideological' fallacies contributes in a special way to the critical orientation which courses in critical thinking want to foster in students.
Ideology and fallacy
The program formulated above to extend the critique which logic employs against fallacious reasoning to a critique of argumentation which serves an ideological purpose demands a negative or critical concept of ideology. However, such a concept of ideology is confronted in contemporary literature on the subject by a dominantly positive or neutral concept of ideology. In this section I shall argue that a negative or critical concept of ideology does have some legitimacy. Ideological argumentation has not (to any noticeable extent) been made an object of study in informal logic. It has, however, received some attention in studies on rhetoric. It seems that in this context authors generally favour the neutral concept of ideology.3 The neutral concept of ideology can be illuminated by the metaphor of 'social cement': an ideology is a system of ideas (or alternatively a systema tized set of values) which establishes social relations and fosters social coherence and integration. The neutral concept of ideology is also elaborated in the Marxist tradition from Lenin through Lukács and Gramsci to Althusser. In this tradition the 'social cement' of ideology unifies members of a class on the level of class consciousness. In Lenin, for example, socialist consciousness is a fusion of proletarian class consciousness, ideology and science (Larrain, 1983:68) . In the non-Marxist tradition too, influential contemporary authors (like Clifford Geertz For example: Balthrop, 1984:343; McGee & Martin, 1983 :50. Chaim Pcrelman (1979 writes: "To exercise power it is essential that it be rccognizcd as legitimate and that it enjoys an authority that brings about the consent of those who arc subject to it. This is the necessary role of ideologies. [...] Denying all value to ideologies is to return political life to an armed struggle for power from which the most influential military leader will undoubtably emerge successful." This conception of ideology leads to the consequence that it "is from another ideology, another ideal of man and society that the prevailing ideolog' can be criticized" (Perelman, 1979:143) , which seems to exclude a logical critique of ideological reasoning and Martin Seliger) seem to prefer some version of the neutral or positive concept of ideology. The predominance of the neutral concept of ideology in literature on the subject should, however, not be allowed to obscure the fact that there also exists a tradition of the negative use of the concept.4 This negative, critical concept of ideology goes back to Napoleon's abusive use of the term ideologues for members of Destutt de Tracy's Institut National and his derogatory reference to the term ideology as a kind of 'shadowy metaphysics' (cf. Thompson, 1990:31) . De Tracy's Elements d 'Idéologie (1803 'Idéologie ( -1815 is an exercise in foundationalism: the project of his 'science of ideas' as a 'first science' is to give a foundation for all knowledge and the rational management of social relations and social change. This 'science of ideas' was conceived only to counteract the effects of the Jacobin Terror during the French Revolution and not to abrogate the project of the Enlightenment as such. It was in effect a re-affirmation of this project and of the declaration of universal human rights. Thus, although Napoleon at first supported De Tracy's project, he later became a vehement critic of 'ideology' and the 'ideologues' because their project was incompatible with his authoritarian rule as First Consul (1799-1810). Napoleon's use of the term ideology was a first step in the development of a negative meaning of the term: as De Tracy used it, it referred in a neutral way to the science o f ideas; as Napoleon used it, it referred also to the ideas themselves as a system of ideas which are erroneous and divorced from the realities of political practice (cf. Thompson, 1990:32) .
M arx's negative concept of ideology
Through his exile in Paris (1844-1845) Marx was familiar with De Tracy's work and Napoleon's attack on it; he and Engels employed the concept in a negative sense in The German Ideology, which was written immediately after the end of Marx's exile . In the initial stages of the development of its meaning, the negative import of the concept of ideology was based on a rather simplistic contrast between abstract ideas and concrete political practice. Marx, however, underpins the negative content of the concept with a philosophical theory of some sophistication. In the present context two features of Marx's theory of ideology need to be highlighted: the illusionary and misleading nature of these ideas and the functional nature of these ideas.
'Ideological 'fallacies
Marx's critical conception of ideology links up with the first stage in the de velopment of the negative meaning of the concept, in which 'abstract' ideas are contrasted with concrete practical activity. However, in Marx the disjunction between 'theory' and 'praxis' is not a polemical move, but it is something which has a historical origin in the division of material and mental labour. According to Marx this division enables consciousness to emancipate itself from existing practice and "flatter itself... th at... it is really conceiving something without con ceiving something rea l... and ... proceed to the formation of 'pure' theory, theo logy, philosophy, ethics, etc." (Marx & Engels, 1938:20) . This body of ideas is 'ideological' in the sense that it produces the illusion that it constitutes a separate, real and independent sphere which is completely divorced from the field of hu man praxis, and that it causally influences the concrete historical situation in which people make history by producing and reproducing their material existence. It is crucial for understanding Marx's concept of ideology to note that the autonomy and efficacy of ideas which are divorced from praxis are illusionary. Such ideas are but "reflexes and echos" (Marx & Engels, 1938:14) . Nevertheless they are "the ideal expression of the dominant material relationship grasped as ideas; hence of the relationships which make the one class the ruling one, therefore the ideas of its dominance" (Marx & Engels, 1938:39) . In Marx's fa mous phrase the "ideas of the ruling class are in every epoch the ruling ideas" which serve to entrench, perpetuate and rationalize its power (Marx & Engels, 1938:39) . It seems to me that if one wants to take the tradition of the negative concept of ideology seriously in the present, two elements of Marx's theory of ideology need to be salvaged, i.e. his insistence on the misleading and illusionary character of ideology, and the function ideological discourse has in sustaining relations of domination, inequality and exploitation. It is not possible to give a detailed critique of all the relevant theses of Marx's philosophy within the confines of this paper; therefore I shall mention only two which are crucial in the present context. In my view these theses have become untenable and are therefore not incorporated in the negative concept of ideology which is proposed here.
Relations of domination and exploitation
In Marx relations of domination and exploitation in modem Western society are understood exclusively in terms of the relation between owners of the means of production and the working class, whose members are compelled to sell their labour on the market. In present-day Western societies, however, the lines of demarcation which Marx employed to differentiate between classes in capitalist society have become fuzzy, with the result that relations of domination and
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Koers 59 (I) 1994:37-51 Pieter van I 'eiiren exploitation which are not based on class have gained in definition and promi nence, e.g. those based on gender, ethnicity and economic hegemony ('NorthSouth' divide).
Ideology as 'ideas' and ideas being essentially passive
In Marx's theory of ideology ideas or theories which are divorced from praxis are 'ideological'. The emphasis on 'ideas' (or 'systems of ideas') harks back to the original meaning of the term ideology in De Tracy's "Elements of Ideology". This emphasis on 'ideas' is characteristic of the age of rationalism and 'philosophy-as-epistemology'. Moreover, in The German Ideology Marx views ideolo gical ideas as "echos" and "reflections" of the "real forces and relations of pro duction". These metaphors suggest that ideology is essentially passive -a point which Marx wishes to make against Hegel. Marx's metaphor of an 'ideological superstructure' has the same import: it is based on naval terminology which refers to the superstructure of a ship, which is based on the hull of the ship and is bound to follow its movement. Both of these claims of Marx -i.e. that ideology is constituted by 'ideas' and that these ideas are essentially passive -have been firmly set aside in recent literature on ideology which connects ideology with language5
Ideology as discourse
The connection of ideology with language has some important implications for the study of ideology: it turns it away from the study of 'ideas' towards a study of language. In the context of language 'ideas' cease to be purely mental phenomena: rather they are utterances, expressions -i.e. words which are spoken or inscribed and circulate in a social world in which people communicate with each other, interact with each other, produce history and reproduce the society in which they live. Language itself is, to paraphrase Thompson (1990: 58) , a constitutive factor of social reality and is actively involved in the creation of relations between individuals and groups. Therefore, in the context of lan guage, ideology does not exist in 'passive' ideas but in the active ways in which language serves to establish and to sustain relations of domination. Domination obtains ... when established relations o f power are 'systematically asymm etrical', that is, when particular agents or groups o f agents are endowed with power in a durable way which excludes, and to some significant degree remains in-J.B. Thompson (1984) reviews the (mainly French) literature on the relationship between ideology and language.
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'Ideological 'fallacies accessible to, other agents or groups o f agents, irrespective o f the basis upon which such exclusion is carried out (Thompson, 1990:59) .
Language can of course be studied on various levels (e.g. the levels of phonology, morphology, syntax, etc.). The level on which language functions in everyday communication and interaction between people is primarily the level of discourse, in other words the level of linguistic units that exceed the limits of single sentences. Instances of discourse are conversations, speeches, texts, etc. (cf. Thompson, 1984:8) . Language on the level of discourse is capable of sustaining the functional nature of ideology which I have already pointed out: it is on this level that a complex series of strategies by which language is mobilized for the maintenance of relations of domination come into operation. This means that a study of ideology is not so much a study of the content of 'ideas' but of the va rious ways in which discursive language serves to establish and sustain relations of domination in concrete situations (cf. Thompson, 1984:41) . If an analysis of ideology is conceived in this way, it must perforce be contextualized. The 'ideo logicalness' of instances of discourse is not an 'inherent' feature of these instan ces, but rather a feature which is constituted by the function of discourse in spe cific social situations. These concrete social situations require close conside ration, and where necessary social-historical analysis in order to amass and pre sent evidence of power relations which are "systematically asymmetrical" (cf. Thompson, 1990:23, 283-4) . Thompson (1990:60) presents a list which suggests five different ideological functions which discourse may have. I want to draw on his suggestions in the following reconstruction, but I shall not follow it in detail because of some measure of confusion it seems to contain concerning the argumentative structure discourse may exhibit in some instances. While Thompson accords a subordinate position to argumentative structure in his list (he ties it rather exclusively to rationalization as a "strategy of symbolic construction"), I want to propose that argumentative structure be accorded a more important place in the analysis of discourse. Analysis of a variety of texts in which language acquires an ideolo gical function, suggests a division of discourse into at least two main categories, i.e. that of argumentative discourse and that of suggestive discourse.6 While the first type of discourse is characterized by reasoning, the second type is characThis categorization does not intend to be exhaustive: there are various other types of discourse (eg narrative, descriptive, etc.) and various strategics other than those mentioned in Table 1 . Furthermore, one type of discourse is seldom found without the admixture of other types. Tabic 1 represents the barest minimum of distinctions which arc necessary for my argument in this paper.
Ideological functions of discourse
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terized by rhetorical procedures. Various powerful argumentative and rhetorical strategies which can have an ideological function can be linked to these types of discourse, as the table below shows.
T able 1 Strategies and ideological functions of various types of discourse
Types
Strategies Functions
The distinction between argumentative and suggestive types of discourse seems to me to be of importance for the program which I propose, i.e. to extend the logical critique of fallacious reasoning to discourse which serves to sustain relations of domination. This program presupposes that such discourse has at least in some instances an argumentative structure. It seems to me that discourse which serves to entrench relations of domination proceeds by way of argumen tation especially in those cases where justification or legitimacy is sought by providing grounds or reasons for the implementation or existence of social policies or measures which facilitate domination and exploitation. Argumentative strategies need to be clearly distinguished from strategies which operate through suggestion in order to dissimulate relations of domination and exploitation. I shall first discuss some of these mainly rhetorical strategies and then return to the strategies of argumentation.
Rhetorical strategies
As Thompson (1990:62) * F ragm entation is a strategy which has been used in South Africa to great effect. It consists in fragmenting individuals or groups that are mounting an effective challenge to the dominant group. In the 80s it w as often claimed by supporters o f the policy o f apartheid that 'South Africa is a country o f racial and tribal minorities'. This w as said at a time in which black opposition to apartheid w as more unified than ever, and w as meant to deflect attention from this fact.
Strategies of argumentation
I shall now discuss two argum ents which satisfy the criteria specified above for fallacious reasoning with an ideological function, i.e. they are both p o te n tia lly m isleadin g and they have in fact s e r v e d to establish a n d ju s tify rela tio n s o f dom ination a n d exploita tio n ?
Universalization: appeal to the public interest
Domination and exploitation have no inherent sanction and must therefore derive it from elsewhere, for example from religious beliefs or from the criterion o f public interest.8
An appeal to the public interest in argumentative discourse may have the function o f establishing and justifying relations o f domination and exploitation. A ppeals to the public interest occur frequently in discussions and debates concerning public More examples o f arguments which may be construed as 'ideological' fallacies can be found in Van Veuren (1991:114-115 ).
See in this regard Flathm an (1973).
policy, in which cases it serves as a criterion by which public policy may be measured. If a policy is judged to be in the 'public interest' (or in the 'interest of the country') it is implied that the costs and benefits o f the policy in principle accrue indiscriminately to all members o f the community. Such is the conven tional connotation o f the term.
In order to ascertain whether a specific instance o f argumentative justification o f a policy or law by an appeal to the public interest has an ideological function and contains fallacious reasoning the argument (such as the following one) must be subjected to close analysis.
The connection between white poverty and the presence of coloureds and natives in the country must be openly faced. It is impossible to make proposals to enhance the economic prosperity of the white poor without affecting the other groups in one way or another. The dilemma in which we find ourselves is that in the interest of the country more prosperity must be gained for the white poor and that, also in the interest of the country, it may not be gained in a way which will make the economic side of the coloured and native problems insoluble. This much must be honestly admitted. Therefore, when discrimination in favour of the white worker can be found in some of the economic proposals, then it must be realized that not only has what is advantageous for our problem group -the white poor -been considered, but what is advantageous for the country! For example, where a certain preferential treatment of the white poor causes a problem -but a soluble problem for the non-white, there has been no hesitation in choosing it ... This is a policy statement if you wish, of giving sympathetic consi deration to the rights and interests of the whites and non-whites, and then resolutely choosing what serves the interest of the community as a whole, even if it has the superficial appearance of preferential treatment (Verwoerd, 1972:55) .
This convoluted argument gives a justification o f 'jo b reservation' by an appeal to the public interest. The argumentation o f V erw oerd's speech can be reconstruc ted according to the following pattern: * (Premise 1) Policy/administrative measure P is in the interests o f group G (formulated explicitly or implicitly). * (Premise 2) (But) policy/administrative measure P is (also) in the pu blic/national interest.
* (Conclusion)
Therefore implementation/existence o f policy/administra tive measure P is justified.
Arguments according to this pattern are o f course not necessarily fallacious arguments -it is conceivable that the interests o f group G coincides completely
Koers 59 (1) 1994:37-51 ' Ideological 'fallacies with the public/national interest. However, if policy/administrative measure P is such that it in fact serves only the economic and/or political interests o f group G, then these p a rtic u la r interests have been u n iversa lized in Premise 2 (i.e. re p re s e n te d as serving the interests o f the community or the nation at large), in such a way that w e get an argument with inconsistent premises. V erw oerd's argument states in Premise W a r is P e a c e
F re e d o m is S la v e ry
Ig n o ra n c e is S tre n g th
The government in 1984 encourages such 'double thinking' in order to condition its subjects to accept indefensible government policies.
The confusing complexity o f V erw oerd's argument tends to hide the inconsistency in its premises. However, if an argument's prem ises are inconsis tent, one o f the statements must necessarily be false, and the conjunction o f the two inconsistent statements is also logically false. Such prem ises necessarily undermine the argument in which they are used. It should be noted that the social-historical context o f V erw oerd's argument is implicated in the reconstruc tion o f the argument w hich is given above. In the face o f a great deal o f evidence (which is common knowledge) it is taken for granted that the apartheid policy o f jo b reservation in fact served only the economic and political pow er interests o f the poor white worker, and (by implication) that the statement made in Prem ise 2 is false. However, common knowledge can be questioned and it could turn out that a detailed social-historical analysis needs to be given to provide better support for the reconstruction o f the argument presented above. In the final ana lysis no con clu sive p r o o f can be given that the argument is incorrect, but a convincing case may still be made that the argument is incorrect and has contri buted to establishing and sustaining relations o f domination and exploitation.
Deification: appeal to the will of God
Relations o f social, political and economic domination in South African society mainly coincide with the primary division between 'w hite' and 'non-w hite'. Divisions o f a society according to skin colour in order to establish asymmetrical relations o f pow er in the society differ from other criteria o f division in that they are based on an empirical criterion. W hereas social divisions on the basis o f class, religion or language may have blurred edges and may be disguised in various ways, division according to skin colour is unambiguous and very obvious. The social, economic and political subordination o f one group to the other on the basis o f skin colour cannot easily be dissimulated, but needs to be justified directly.
One o f the w ays this is done in argumentative discourse is by an appeal to the will o f God. Relations o f domination are justified as unalterable 'ordinances o f creation' or as an expression o f G od's will which cannot be questioned and must therefore be accepted. This strategy o f deification is employed in the following argument.
T h e c o n g re ss [ 'C o n g re s s o f th e P e o p le ' at B lo e m fo n te in , S e p te m b e r 1944] a ls o sta te d its c o n v ic tio n th a t th is p o lic y [ o f ra c ia l a p a rth e id ] 'is b a s e d on H o ly S c rip tu re w h ic h te a c h e s u s th a t n o t u n ifo rm ity b u t m u ltip lic ity o f n a tio n s is th e w ill o f G o d an d th a t h e f u lfils h is d e s ig n th ro u g h th e m u ltip lic ity o f n a tio n s, ra c e s , la n g u a g e s a n d c u ltu r e s ' . .. w h e n G o d w ills a d iv isio n , th e n h e w ills it in a n a b s o lu te se n se (G ro e n e w a ld , 1 9 4 7 :4 2 , 49).
The structure o f this argument can be represented in the following way:
A asserts that policy/administrative measure P is the will o f God/in accordance with the will o f God. * (Conclusion 1/ Policy/administrative measure P is the will o f Premise 2) God/in accordance with the will o f God. * (Conclusion 2) The implementation/existence o f policy/administrative measure P is justified.
Assertions about the will o f God usually make an appeal to authoritative inter pretations o f the Bible. In some cases reference to A (Premise 1) is omitted, sup pressed, or an a d p o p u lu m appeal is substituted for it. In cases where an appeal is explicitly made to an authoritative interpretation o f the Bible the argument is fallacious if the authoritative wisdom is prejudiced by special interests and is therefore ipso fa c to controversial, or controversial for other reasons.9 This is the case in the example above, where the authority to which an appeal is made is the 'Congress o f the [white Afrikaner] People'. This appeal does not give any sup port to the claim made in conclusion 1, or in the (implied) conclusion 2 o f the ar gument, i.e. that the implementation o f the policy o f apartheid is justified. Again it should be noted that the social-historical context o f the argument is implicated F o r exam ple: the authoritative pronouncem ent is not consistent w ith w hat other experts in the relevant dom ain say, o r is inconsistent with know n evidence in the relevant dom ain (W alton, 1989) .
'Ideological 'fallacies in the construal o f the argument as a fallacious appeal to authority (a d verecundiam ). The special interest (economic and political pow er conferred on white Afrikaner people by the policy o f racial apartheid) which qualifies the authority as 'prejudicial' in this case, is taken to be common knowledge. However, this con strual o f the argument and the contribution it made to establishing and sustaining relations o f domination in South Africa could be better supported and clarified by a social-historical analysis.
'Taxonom y'
I would like to turn now to the second problem mentioned in the Introduction, i.e. the place which 'ideological' fallacies are to be accorded in a 'taxonom y' o f fallacies. The claim that there are 'ideological' fallacies obviously does not com mit one to hold that a ll id eo lo g ica l argu m en ts a re fa lla cio u s. Besides, the state ment in italics is untenable because it is easy to think o f an ideological argument (i.e. one which justifies domination and exploitation) which is not fallacious (al though it might be in ciden tally devious or wrong-headed (or both) because it has debatable premises and makes untenable assumptions). By w ay o f example:
If it is desirable to maintain W estern norms and standards in South Africa then the great majority o f the black popu lation should be re-located in the traditional tribal areas or 'hom elands'.
* (Premise 2)
It is desirable to maintain W estern norms and standards in South Africa.
(Conclusion) Therefore the great majority o f the black population should be re-located in the traditional areas or 'hom e lands'.
W hat I wish to argue is that som e cases o f ideological reasoning are not in ci den tally devious or w rong-headed (or both), but exhibit a ty p ica l procedure o f reasoning which, although it is in correct, can have the a p p ea ra n ce o f correct reasoning and therefore can be (and in fact often is) mistakenly taken for correct reasoning by the person proposing the argument and/or the recipients o f the argument. For example: under certain conditions ideological reasoning universa lizes particular interests in such a w ay (an appeal to the public interest) that the argument acquires inconsistent premises. Because o f the manner in which the ar gument proceeds, or because o f psychological factors, or lack o f know ledge (or all o f these factors), the incorrectness o f the reasoning is not apparent, and the ar gument can fool some people some o f the time.
Although the 'ideological' fallacies which I have discussed in this section do exhibit typ ica l characteristics in that they (respectively) make an appeal to 'the public interest' and to 'the will o f G od' it does not seem w arranted to place them in a class o f their own next to the main classes o f fallacies which are usually distinguished (fallacies o f relevance, unacceptable premises, etc.), because the incorrect reasoning in them can be subsumed under existing main classes of fallacies (inconsistent premises under unacceptable premises and a d verecundiam under fallacies o f relevance). Therefore I want to suggest that these 'ideological' fallacies be taken as typ ica l variation s o f the inconsistent premises and the a d verecundiam fallacies.
Critical thinking in the 'strong sense'
Definitions o f critica l thinking, a concept which originated in the USA in the 40s (Paul, 1992:1) are, to use a cliché, a dime a dozen. Because o f the large number o f definitions in circulation I shall simplify and highlight only the principal connotation which the term critica l has acquired in combination with the term thinking.
There seems to be some consensus that 'critical thinking' can be defined in terms o f a "skill dimension" and a "dispositional dimension" (Facione, 1991:8) . The qualification 'critical' seems to be connected more directly with the 'skill dimen sion': skills in (for example) interpretation, analysis and inference have asso ciated criteria by which their execution can be meaningfully evaluated. 'Critical' thinking would thus seem to be thinking which is explicitly aw are o f the criteria to which it should conform. In my view this connotation o f 'critical' as a quali fication o f 'thinking' is unproblematic. However, the reservation should be made that it can lead (and in fact has led) to a limited conception o f the task o f critical thinking. Critical thinking which sets itself only the limited task o f teaching students certain skills and the criteria which apply to them, tends to narrow the context in which these skills are exercised to the lecture room, and to select illustrative examples which have been divorced from the social context in which they function (or functioned). There is a tendency to present such examples to students as isolated logical puzzles, the solutions giving them some intellectual satisfaction but rarely confront them with the social-historical world in which they are active participants and which in its turn acts upon them.
Richard Paul (1982:3) has described critical thinking which is informed by this limited perspective on its own goals as "critical thinking in the weak sense" (in contrast to "critical thinking in the strong sense"). The former is the "traditional conception" o f critical thinking. Paul does not scrap the 'traditional conception' but views it as "a limited set o f moves within a more complex set o f actual or possible moves reflecting a variety o f logically significant engagements in the world" (Paul, 1982: 3).
With a view to "logically significant engagements in the world", the main purpose o f my essay has been to develop a theoretical framework which may enable critical thinking to extend the scope o f its critique to discourse which sometimes serves to establish, justify and dissimulate relations o f domination and exploita tion in the social w orld.10 Teaching critical thinking 'in the strong sense' in this context would amount to building bridges between the academic study o f argu ment and the social world, for example by pointing out to students that argumen tative discourse often intersects with relations o f pow er and domination in the social world, and that this discourse can be subjected to a logical critique. Such a critique o f ideological reasoning can be a means o f self-enlightenment about one's own vested interests and the ways in which one is moved by them to accept claims which are not supported by correct reasoning. 
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